The e¤ect of inequality on economic growth and e¢ ciency is often debated. Our study investigates a behavioral phenomenon through which inequality might have adverse e¤ects on economic growth. In particular we investigate whether or not individuals exhibit a discouragement e¤ect in the face of inequality that leads to lower work e¤ort. If such an e¤ect exists it provides a mechanism for converting even idiosyncratic inequality into sustained inequality with adverse consequences for the individuals being a¤ected by the inequality and the economy as a whole. We investigate this phenomenon using an economic experiment to allow us to cleanly vary the nature of inequality and to allow us to directly observe several characteristics of the workers. We …nd robust support for the existence of a discouragement e¤ect lending credibility to the claims that such an e¤ect would exist in external situations among workers confronted with disadvantageous inequality. JEL Codes: C90, D61, D63, O15, O40
Introduction
Economists have established many ways in which initial inequality may in ‡uence the paths of economic development. In a series of historical studies, Engerman and Sokolo¤ (1997 , 2002 argue that the initial di¤erences in factor endowments between the North and South America contributed to the emergence of di¤erent institutions between the two regions, which in turn led to the divergence in the rates of growth. Persson and Tabellini (1994) examine more recent data and argue that there is a signi…cant and large negative relation between inequality and growth while Banerjee and Du ‡o (2003) argue that the relationship between growth and inequality is an inverted U-shaped function. Understanding the relationship between inequality and economic growth is important in the design of a broad range of economic development policies and there is a substantial literature which investigates the mechanics behind the linkages between growth and inequality. Loury (1981) , Galor and Zeira (1993) , Banerjee and Newman (1993) , Durlauf (1996) , Benabou (1996 Benabou ( , 2000 and Mookherjee and Ray (2003) are well-established studies in the literature and the typical nature of the proposed linkage between inequality and either growth or persistent inequality in these papers is di¤erential endowment or investment opportunities of agents often in the form of human capital and occupational choice.
We propose a new possible linkage between inequality and growth which may also be useful in explaining the persistence of inequality. The linkage we propose is the incentive e¤ects of inequality from a behavioral perspective. Speci…cally, we argue that individuals may respond not just to the absolute return on their e¤ort but also to their return relative to that of others. If present, this e¤ect can lead to inequality having a direct impact on the decisions of individuals unlike in the existing literature wherein it only alters aggregate societal outcomes. To explain the nature of the e¤ect we investigate, suppose that due to her identity marks such as gender, caste, or race, an individual receives lesser rewards than others in her society for the same amount of e¤ort provided. Then, one can envision this individual eventually becoming discouraged by repeatedly facing disadvantageous inequality and this could result in her exhibiting a variety of responses ranging from decreased on the job work e¤ort to decreased human capital acquisition and decreased contributions to public goods.
If such a behavioral response to inequality exists then there are a number of important consequences associated with it. First, this e¤ect ceteris paribus would generate a negative relationship between inequality and economic growth. There are a number of forces at play in an aggregate economy so this is not to claim that the overall relationship between inequality and growth must be negative if this e¤ect exists but the partial e¤ect of inequality on growth due to this behavioral e¤ect would be negative. Second, separately or in addition to the theoretical models cited above, this e¤ect could generate persistent inequality from initial idiosyncratic inequality. The reason is that even if the initial inequality were idiosyncratic, if a worker responds by exerting lesser e¤ort or investing less in human capital, then this response has the potential to legitimize and then perpetuate the initially low rewards for that individual or group. Thus initial idiosyncratic inequality can be converted into longer term inequality. Any potential discouragement e¤ect is, of course, likely to be worsened if the inequality in rewards is related to a more generalized social phenomenon of racial, ethnic, gender or caste based discrimination in which individuals from these disadvantaged groups expect to be confronted with unequal treatment in many aspects of their lives.
There is of course also the possibility of a counter e¤ect which we might refer to as an "encouragement e¤ect" in which those who are subject to advantageous inequality may bene…t from the inequality and therefore work harder. The ultimate question of empirical interest is if either of these two e¤ects exist and if both do what the net e¤ect is on overall productivity. The goal of the present study is to examine exactly this issue in order to determine the likely e¤ect on overall productivity due to the existence of inequality. We present the results of a laboratory based experimental study designed to allow clean inference on whether or not individuals become discouraged or encouraged in the face of inequality. The environment we construct in our experiment should be a very strong test of the discouragement e¤ect in particular because many of the aspects of discrimination and long run experience with inequality will not be present in the experiment. Consequently, if we …nd a discouragement e¤ect in our simpli…ed laboratory environment then it will be an indication that such an e¤ect could exist in a broader context in which the inequality is based on overt discrimination and individuals would have long term experience with feeling the e¤ects of inequality.
There is prior evidence on this issue but both the sign and robustness of any e¤ect is unclear. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) propose a similar e¤ect to what we refer to as a discouragement e¤ect in the form of their "fair wage-e¤ort hypothesis"but provide relatively weak support for its existence. Ho¤ and Pandey (2006) come substantially closer to demonstrating a discouragement e¤ect as they provide evidence that low caste children in India decrease their performance when their caste identity is made salient. This performance drop is argued to be due to the anticipation of disadvantageous treatment leading to discouragement once the caste information is revealed, but actual treatment was in fact unchanged. While this is suggestive of a discouragement e¤ect due to unequal treatment, there are also other plausible explanations such as stereotype threat (Steele and Aronson, 1995) . There are a range of other studies which attempt to identify e¤ects like this in naturally occurring data typically focusing on wage inequality in workplaces. However, data limitations in these studies lead to substantial inference problems. Much of the wage di¤erences in workplaces will be due to di¤erences in ability or skill which is not the sort of inequality we are investigating. While there may be some unfairness in naturally occurring wage schedules it is di¢ -cult to separate cleanly between a wage that is unfairly low and one that is deservedly low due to skill di¤erences or to traits which would be unobserved by a researcher.
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Proper inference on the e¤ects of inequality on e¤ort though requires cleanly severing the link between wages and characteristics of a worker to …nd situations in which it is clear that "unfair inequality" is present. Were we able to …nd situations in which wages clearly satisfy this criteria there is also an empirical di¢ culty in observing work e¤ort. E¤ort itself is rarely observable and the measurement of most proxies for work e¤ort in common use such as the rate of promotion or turnover are potentially related to any discrimination that generated the wage inequality. Even were a viable proxy for e¤ort to be available, there is still a problem of separating out e¤ort di¤erences due to a pure wage e¤ect and e¤ort di¤erences due to the existence of inequality. Separating these e¤ects requires observing workers exerting e¤ort when faced with the same wage in similar environments that di¤er only in regard to whether or not wage inequality is present. Due to these di¢ culties in inference from naturally occurring data, we present evidence from a laboratory experiment in which we will be able to observe e¤ort directly while implementing exogenously set wage schedules with and without inequality to overcome these limits on inference.
In this study the type of inequality we are interested in modeling is not wage inequality generated by trait di¤erences among workers nor is it wage inequality that can be overcome by working hard and being promoted to a higher wage job. The wages in our experimental environment are really a stand-in for economic opportunities and the type of inequality we model is inequality due to caste, ethnicity or gender based discrimination. This is why our environment will not allow for workers to be "promoted"to a better wage rate through higher e¤ort as in the situations in which we are interested one can not be "promoted" to a di¤erent caste or ethnicity based on higher e¤ort. Through high e¤ort a member of a low caste might be able obtain earnings equal to a member of a preferred caste, but in societies with strong caste based discrimination the opportunities a¤orded to the low caste member will still be lesser. We wish to highlight the nature of the process which generates inequality as the process is almost certainly important for understanding the e¤ects of the inequality. This is the subject of a growing literature on procedural fairness as discussed in Trautmann (2009), Karni, Salmon, and Sopher (2008) and Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels (2005) .
In our experiment equally quali…ed individuals engage in a real-e¤ort task (encoding random sequences of letters into numerical code) for piece rate earnings. The wage rates are exogenously assigned and they are a proxy for general opportunity or rewards for e¤ort.
2 Our design includes control sessions in which all subjects receive 1 Heckman, Lyons, and Todd (2000) summarizes the literature on identifying race based discrimination in wages against blacks in the US and explains many of the inherent problems in such attempts.
2 An important detail about the e¤ect we propose is that we deal with the notion of inequality in "rewards" as opposed to "endowments." This distinction between di¤erent types of inequality is discussed in Hopkins and Kornienko (2010) in which it is pointed out that the term "inequality" means many di¤erent things in the vast literature discussing it and often the di¤erential consquences equal wages so that we can identify the inequality e¤ect by comparing the performance of workers receiving a particular wage in sessions with no inequality to that of workers receiving the same wage in the presence of inequality. Our experimental design will also address a less commonly investigated issue regarding how the response to inequality might vary with the relative sizes of the advantaged and disadvantaged groups. Relative group size may be important because the existence of an incentive e¤ect hinges on workers perceiving a low wage as being unfair. That perception of unfairness may be diminished if the majority of workers are receiving the same low wage and may be heightened if only a small number do. To examine this possibility our experiments will vary the size of the high and low wage groups to determine if there is a systematic response of individuals to the status of their groups as being a numerical minority or majority.
In the end we do …nd that a discouragement e¤ect exists and it is of non-trivial size. We do not …nd evidence in favor of an encouragement e¤ect. This pair of …ndings are quite important because they provide a demonstration of one channel through which inequality can lead to a decrease in economic e¢ ciency. We also …nd results suggesting that the source of the inequality can be an important factor, at least for some individuals. Previous research in Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels (2005) shows that some individuals will judge the fairness of an allocation based on the procedure used to generate it rather than just the allocation itself. We use what is sometimes considered a procedurally fair procedure for generating the inequality in our experiment (i.e. pure randomization) and …nd that subjects who we can measure separately as being more likely to view the allocation as unfair generate a much stronger response.
In section 2 we will provide an overview of our experiment design. Section 3 will present a series of hypotheses regarding what one might expect to observe in the experiments based on prior literature. In section 4 we will present our results and we will provide a concluding discussion in section 5.
Experimental Design
The base task in this experiment involves subjects taking randomly generated strings of 4-letter "words" and using a code key to translate those letters into a numerical code. The subjects were shown the encoding key and the string of letters on a screen and would enter the encoded version below the word. The same code key was used for the entire session. They had a button which would allow them to submit a word and after doing so they would be immediately given a new word. For every word they encoded correctly they were paid a piece rate wage which was exogenously set by the experimenters at the beginning of the session. This production task is very of the two are overlooked. We agree that the distinction is important and we will discuss the issue further in section 3. Erkal, Gangadharan, and Nikiforakis (2008) . We use a real e¤ort production task rather than a stylized e¤ort design in which subjects choose e¤ort numbers on a given range because the e¤ect we are investigating involves an emotional response to the stimulus and it seems more likely to emerge out of real e¤ort than out of a stylized e¤ort experiment. Each session consisted of 16 subjects and these 16 subjects were divided into two sets of 8 at random. Inside of those sets of 8, subjects were further randomly assigned into what we labeled "blue"and "green"groups. The subjects were informed of the color of their group before anything else happened in the experiment as an attempt to make it clear that group assignment was exogenous. The meaning of the group assignment was only explained later to the subjects and the actual meaning referred to the wage rate they would be assigned. Table 1 provides a summary of the experimental treatments as well as the number of observations of sets of 8 subjects for each treatment. There are a total of four treatments contained in this design. There are two control treatments called Common Wage -Low and Common Wage -High in which all subjects received the same common wage regardless of group assignment.
3 For consistency with the other treatments subjects were still divided such that there were 6 members of the blue group and 2 of the green in each treatment but the wages across groups were constant. The high wage was $0.09 per correctly encoded word while the low wage was $0.03. The other two treatments will be called the Disadvantaged Minority treatment (Disad Min) and the Disadvantaged Majority treatment (Disad Maj). These two treatments introduce inequality by having one group possess the high wage and the other the low such that in the Minority treatment, the members of the 2-person group are assigned the low wage while in the Majority treatment the members of the 6-person group are assigned the low wage.
The experiment was programmed using z-Tree, Fischbacher (2007) . After subjects saw an initial screen indicating the color of the group to which they were assigned, they were presented with a sample of the main screen for the experiment showing them the encoding task. In the course of explaining this screen to the subjects, they were explicitly informed of the wage rates that would be in e¤ect for both groups.
Also, before each round of production, subjects would see a screen which included a table showing them a column for each subject in their 8-subject set indicating their group color and corresponding wage rate. The idea of stating this information to them repeatedly was to ensure that they clearly understood both the wage rate di¤erential as well as the relative size of both groups. After the …rst round, this screen also showed them information on their own past earnings. They were not shown the earnings or production levels of other individuals in the experiment at any time. The only information they see about other subjects is their wage rates. As such there are no interactions between members of a group or members of a set making each subject independent of the others. This choice of feedback was made so that the only things that should be salient to the subjects that might a¤ect their behavior are the treatment variables themselves and any session or group e¤ects should be minimal.
In order to give subjects an outside option should they wish to avoid the production task, we included another task on their screen. This other task was the option of playing Tic-Tac-Toe (TTT) against a computer player, not against another subject, which might be interpreted as a "shirking" option. The computerized opponent was programmed to be moderately di¢ cult but beat-able. This task was only minimally incentivized in that it paid a subject $0.01 per win. Due to the di¤erence between this wage rate as well as the time it would take to win a game and the wage rate and time to correctly encode a word for the encoding task, it should have been quite clear to subjects that TTT would never compete in …nancial terms with the main task. It was designed mainly to be at least mildly more "fun"than the encoding task and allow subjects who did not want to engage in encoding another activity so that they would not just have to stare at the screen in boredom. The importance of including a task such as this is demonstrated in Engel (2007) in which it is demonstrated that the presence of an outside option such as this eliminates non-incentivized over production found in earlier real e¤ort games.
There were 12 rounds of production in each session with each round lasting for four minutes. Subjects were not instructed on which task to engage in but rather they were told how both worked, the wage rates of both and then told they were free to allocate their time between the two tasks as they wished. 4 At the end of each of the 12 rounds, each subject was presented with the screen summarizing her output in the encoding task, earnings from the encoding task, earnings from TTT, and cumulative earnings. On the practice screen they were also allowed to practice TTT as well as the encoding task for a few times before moving on to the …rst paying round. The experiment included multiple rounds of production speci…cally because we expected that for any impact of inequality to manifest in e¤ort levels it would take continued exposure to inequality as subjects might need time to develop an emotional response to the existence of inequality.
At the end of the 12 rounds we had subjects …ll out a short demographic questionnaire and complete two short sets of questions intended to measure various aspects of 4 Full instruction scripts are available from the authors upon request. cognitive decision making. The …rst of these is the Cognitive Re ‡ection Test (CRT) described in Frederick (2005) . This three question test is designed to determine the degree to which subjects engage in thoughtful and re ‡ective versus quick and impulsive decision making. For example, one of the questions is:
"A bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?"
The most common quick answer one might come up with is $0.10 but this is clearly wrong as upon further re ‡ection the correct answer is $0.05. We used this measure because those who score low on it may be more inclined to make impulsive decisions and that impulsiveness might well lead to exhibiting greater e¤ects due to the treatments.
We also used a second set of questions involving pattern matching problems in which we asked subjects to …ll in the number that …ts best in sequences such as: 3 6 9 12 (_). We had 10 sequences of this sort that varied in di¢ culty. This structure of these questions were drawn from standard IQ tests and, while certainly not a complete version of such a test, the results on it should correlate with the results on a standard IQ test. More speci…cally it should measure a general facility with numerate tasks and so we will refer to this as measuring "numeracy."Our interest in this measure is that highly numerate subjects may be "overachievers" on tasks outside the lab and therefore might respond di¤erently to the presence of inequality. Subjects received no payment for completing these questions and we gave them 100 seconds per test to complete as many of the questions as they could in the time frame.
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We have conducted 11 sessions with 176 subjects, mostly undergraduate students, generating the number of sets per treatment as noted in Table 1 . All subjects received $10 for showing up to the session and sessions last a little over an hour. Subjects earned on average $28.89 ($39.72 for high wage workers and $19.86 for low wage workers) including their show-up fee.
Hypotheses
As a way of providing a framework for evaluating the results of the experiment we will present a simple but ‡exible theoretical framework to describe the potential e¤ects of inequality on behavior. From this model we will then derive a series of hypotheses that will help to organize the presentation of the results.
Consider the utility function for an individual i as speci…ed in equation (1). Let w i be the wage received by individual i, n i the productivity level chosen by individual i while we also de…ne w = 1 I P I j=1 w j ; W = (w 1 ; :::; w I ) and N = (n 1 ; :::; n I ): We will let c(n i ) be the direct cost associated with the level of productivity n i . We will use standard assumptions about c( ) which are c 0 > 0 and c 00 > 0: This utility function includes two additional terms to account for two di¤erent ways that wage inequality could impact the behavior of an individual. We will refer to the two e¤ects as the response to unequal wages (i.e. rates of return on e¤ort) and the response to unequal income (i.e. …nal earnings). We must di¤erentiate these two similar seeming issues because they turn out to have substantially di¤erent e¤ects on behavior.
i (w 1 n 1 ; w 2 n 2 ; :::; w I n I )
An individual's response to unequal wages is represented by the function ( ) which accounts for the possibility that the individual experiences some additional psychic cost from engaging in a level of e¤ort n i that is associated with wage inequality. The parameter i 0 indicates the degree to which individual i is concerned about the existence of wage inequality. The form of ( ) or the magnitude of i could be constructed to account for many di¤erent aspects of the judgement about the fairness of the wage pro…le and a general model might take into account the mechanism delivering the inequality into determining the importance of its unfairness. For the purposes of constructing an initial model which is as simple as possible we will assume that ( ) satis…es two properties, n i = 0 if w i = w and n i w i < 0; which together imply that n i > 0 if w i < w and n i < 0 if w i > w. To see the implications of these properties we can set i = 0 and examine the …rst order condition associated with the optimization of (1) with respect to n i which is w i = c 0 (n i ) + i n i (n i ; W ). This condition simply states that the optimal e¤ort level is found where the wage is equal to the marginal cost of e¤ort. Here the marginal cost is composed of the standard marginal cost, c 0 ; and an additional element that arises due to wage inequality, n i : Given the properties of n i it should be clear that an individual with a given wage will face higher (lower) marginal costs of e¤ort when facing disadvantageous (advantageous) inequality than when facing no inequality. This implies a lower (higher) e¤ort by those facing disadvantageous (advantageous) inequality than by those who face no wage inequality. Further, these e¤ects are stronger the farther is w i away from the average wage. For expositional simplicity, we will refer to the motivations behind these di¤erential responses in e¤ort as "aversion" and "a¢ nity" to wage inequality, respectively. Of course the strength of these two e¤ects need not be symmetric.
The last term in (1) captures an individual's response to unequal income. The function ( ) is a measure of the level of inequality in …nal income among all the relevant agents and i 0 is a parameter indicating the degree to which agent i is averse to this inequality. 6 Again, we could construct a complex function for ( ) to account for a number of di¤erent aspects of the e¤ect of income inequality but for the purposes of this exercise we just assume that ( ) is increasing in the variance of the income distribution. The e¤ect of aversion to income inequality on e¤ort is quite di¤erent from how preferences over wage inequality a¤ect e¤ort. The important difference is that a worker's e¤ort can impact the inequality in …nal income but not wage inequality. Any individual whose earnings are below the average can decrease ( ) by increasing their own production and thereby increase their utility, while anyone with above average earnings will do so by decreasing their own production. Consequently, a worker facing disadvantageous inequality will be able to decrease the negative impact on his utility from the presence of inequality in the …nal wealth distribution by increasing his work e¤ort. A worker facing advantageous inequality will do the same by decreasing her work e¤ort.
If subjects are concerned only about wage inequality, then their decision making can be modeled without reference to the behavior of others as the choices of others do not a¤ect their utility. If subjects are concerned about inequality in …nal earnings, i 6 = 0; then the behavior of others becomes important. If we had functional forms for c( ); ( ) and ( ) then we could solve for Nash equilibrium production choices yielding speci…c point predictions on behavior. Since we do not know the correct forms, such point predictions are not possible. What our analysis focuses on instead is examining the comparative statics of how an individual's behavior should be expected to best respond to the presence or absence of wage inequality given their expectations regarding the behavior of others.
Since these two types of potential concern over inequality work in opposite directions it is not possible to separately identify the magnitude of either in our data. The empirical question we can address is whether or not either of the forms of preferences over inequality are strong enough in this task to overcome the other. We summarize the predictions from this analysis as follows.
Hypothesis 1 Discouragement Hypothesis -If workers are relatively more concerned with wage inequality than income inequality, low wage workers will generate less output in the presence of wage inequality as compared to low wage workers observing common wages.
Hypothesis 2 Encouragement Hypothesis -If workers are relatively more concerned with wage inequality than income inequality, high wage workers will generate more output in the presence of wage inequality as compared to high wage workers observing common wages.
Hypothesis 3 Income Inequality Aversion Hypothesis -If workers are relatively more concerned with income inequality than wage inequality, low (high) wage workers will generate more (less) output in the presence of wage inequality as compared to low (high) wage workers observing common wages.
There are two recent papers that address issues related to what we investigate. Charness and Kuhn (2007) is a study based on the gift exchange game that involves a principal contracting with multiple agents and the authors include treatments to determine whether or not making the potentially unequal wages public a¤ects e¤ort levels of the agents. The authors observe no di¤erences in e¤ort levels between those treatments. However, the lack of a di¤erence here is not necessarily conclusive in regard to the hypotheses we propose. In that study, the wages of the workers were set endogenously by a subject in the role of employer and the workers were heterogeneous with respect to the earnings their e¤ort generated to the employer. Therefore, if another subject were receiving a higher wage, that might have been seen as justi…ed based on the di¤erential earnings generated to the employer. In contrast, there is no employer-employee interaction in our design and any inequality in wage rates that our subjects observe is the result of pure randomization, which is likely to lead some of our subjects to perceive the wage inequality as "unfair."If we …nd evidence for the discouragement e¤ect, then it will be an indication that the reason for the inequality, not simply the existence of inequality, is likely to be important to the judgement of unfairness.
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A study closer to our design is Burchett and Willoughby (2004) which presents data from a di¤erent experiment which also tests whether or not publicly announced and di¤erent compensation rates matter. The authors had subjects engage in a real e¤ort task and the subjects received randomly assigned wage structures for performing the same task. While the researchers found clear evidence that public knowledge of the compensation schemes had an impact on e¤ort, it is not certain to what the impacts can be attributed. The confound is due to the fact that some of the subjects received …xed wages while others received piece rate wages which causes any judgement of unfairly unequal compensation among the piece rate earners to be unclear.
We can also extend the analysis to provide a hypothesis regarding di¤erential group sizes across treatments. Our intention with the group size treatments was to provide di¤erent contexts through which subjects might view the inequality. From the point of view of the low wage subjects, one might think that if they were almost singled out to be in the minority of the subjects in the experiment to receive a low wage that this might be viewed as less fair than were they just one among many 7 Note that our environment here is also substantially di¤erent from a standard gift-exchange game (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1993) . A gift-exchange game involves a principal o¤ering a worker a …xed wage independent of e¤ort choice. If a worker exerts low e¤ort after seeing the wage o¤er it is considered to be a way of punishing an employer who has given the worker a payment the worker perceives to be too low. This punishment is costly to the principal but since the agent receives a …xed wage, it is not costly to the agent. In our environment, the only person hurt when one of our workers decreases his e¤ort in response to a low wage or the existence of inequality is himself as the lower e¤ort level yields lower total earnings to him. Thus the mechanism that might produce the encouragement/discouragement response will be very di¤erent from the typical gift-exchange e¤ect. Further, if a subject seeks to punish someone for receiving an unfairly low wage, then the only option for punishment is the experimenter who assigned the wage to him. The only avenue for punishing would then be to work harder to extract more money from the experimenter. Thus if the inequality of wages leads to a punishment act by the subjects then it would work against the Discouragement Hypothesis. who received the low wage. Our model allows us to generate such an e¤ect with no new assumptions. Such an e¤ect is predicated on the aversion to wage inequality dominating the aversion to income inequality. Since we have assumed n i = 0 if w i = w and n i w i < 0; then the psychic cost of e¤ort is higher the farther is one's wage below the average. When the low wage subjects are in the minority, their wage will be farther below the average than when they are in the majority and so their psychic cost of e¤ort will be higher leading to less output. For the high wage earners, the e¤ect is reversed as their wage is farther above the average when there are a minority of high wage earners and thus might experience a stronger encouragement e¤ect in the Disadvantaged Majority.
Hypothesis 4 Group Status Hypothesis -If workers care relatively more about wage inequality than income inequality, there should be a larger discouragement (encouragement) e¤ect among the low (high) wage workers in the Disadvantaged Minority treatment than in the Disadvantaged Majority treatment. Table 2 displays some raw summary statistics regarding average per round output and average number of times per round workers chose to play TTT by treatment with low wage and high wage workers broken out separately. At this level of aggregation it appears that the general directional e¤ects predicted by the discouragement and encouragement hypotheses are present in that for low (high) wage workers the average productivity is lower (higher) in the two sessions with inequality. There does not appear to be a substantial impact on productivity due solely to the wage rate. This might seem counterintuitive as a classic labor supply model suggests that we should get di¤erences in productivity between the two wage levels but that assumes that the marginal cost of an encoding surpasses $0.03 (the lowest piece rate wage) at some point during a production period. Given that we have no control over this marginal cost nor direct knowledge on the marginal cost of completing an encoding, we cannot say whether the marginal cost does or does not rise to this level. Our data, however, are perfectly consistent with the idea that the marginal cost of an encoding is less than $0.03 inside of the time frame of the experiment. As we are concerned with how individuals respond to relative rather than absolute wages this …nding is not a problem and we will not investigate it further. Finally, we see from the summary statistics that neither low nor high wage workers play TTT with great frequency as the average number of games played is around once per round.
Results

Data Overview
Figures 1 -4 allows us to observe if there are di¤erences over time and whether subjects receiving di¤erent scores on the CRT or numeracy measures respond di¤er-ently to the treatments. Figure 1 shows the average output per round separated out by treatment and by high wage versus low wage earners for the entire sample while Figure 2 similarly shows the average propensity of subjects to play TTT per round or the percentage of subjects who played TTT at least once in a round. They may very well have played only once and this should not be interpreted as necessarily implying that the subjects spent substantial time playing TTT. The …rst characteristic to note in the productivity data is that there is a strong learning trend by the subjects as output increases over time due to subjects gaining greater facility with the task and perhaps memorizing portions of the code key. Further, we also see that for low wage earners, the increase in productivity appears to be less in the treatments with inequality than in the control treatment without inequality while the reverse is true for the high wage workers. In examining …gure 2, we see that there is also a noticeable increase in the propensity of low wage subjects in the Disadvantaged Minority treatment playing TTT over the second half of the experiment which is consistent with their drop in productivity in the encoding task. Figures 3 and 4 display similar looks at the productivity data but with the subjects separated into groups by CRT and Numeracy scores. A subject is placed in the Low CRT category if he gave 0 correct answers on the CRT instrument. If he had any correct answers he is placed in the High CRT category. Out of our 176 subjects 57 got at least 1 answer correct on the CRT and the other 119 had 0 correct answers. For Numeracy, we have put those scoring below the median on that measure in the low category and those above the median are in the high category. In examining these …g-ures we see that of course the same general learning trend is observed in the di¤erent groups as in the overall sample but there is a substantial di¤erence between the low and high CRT groups and the low and high Numeracy groups in terms of the response to the introduction of inequality. The Low Wage-Low CRT/Numeracy groups in the inequality treatments exhibit a more substantial performance di¤erential relative to the Low Wage -Low CRT/Numeracy subjects in the treatment without inequality than observed for the overall sample. The Low Wage -High CRT/Numeracy subjects exhibit either no response or perhaps a response consistent with the Income Inequality Aversion Hypothesis as their performance increases slightly in the presence of inequality. This di¤erential response by these di¤erent groups suggests that di¤erent groups may well respond di¤erently to inequality based on personal characteristics. We of course can not draw hard conclusions from these visual inspections though so we will refrain from further discussion of any particular e¤ects until we provide the statistical analysis in the next section.
Prior to engaging in the more careful tests of the hypotheses, it is useful to examine some baseline results on the determinants of productivity that will be important for framing the later analysis. Table 3 contains OLS regressions using as the dependent variable the average output per period of a subject. We use the session wide average for each subject as we are only interested in the overall e¤ects of each of these demographic variables at this point and this speci…cation removes any temporal e¤ects. The dependent variables we use refer to characteristics of the individuals including a dummy variable for the wage rate, a dummy variable for whether or not the subject is in the small group and then a set of demographic and cognitive control measures. We also include a similar set of regressions with the dependent variable being the fraction of periods in which a subject chose to play TTT. The only data considered in these regressions is derived from subjects in the common wage control treatments as our goal here is to obtain some baseline measures on the determinants of overall performance and do not want the confound with any e¤ects that might be due to the presence of inequality. The question these regressions are intended to address is whether any of the demographic and cognitive measures we are using have any substantial impact on productivity or propensity to play TTT. For the cognitive measures we will be using binary measures to indicate whether or not a subject has been categorized as a member of the low group on each measure. Thus L-CRT is equal to 1 if a subject has been sorted into the low CRT group and the same for L-Numeracy.
The results from the regressions in Table 3 demonstrate that for the most part, the demographic and cognitive measures have little impact on the performance of our subjects in the production task and in their propensity to play TTT. 8 There is evidence that NonWhite subjects may have been less likely to play TTT than White subjects but this di¤erence had no signi…cant impact on productivity. In particular we note that the CRT and Numeracy variables that we will use to separate subjects according to in subsequent analysis are both uncorrelated with productivity. This demonstrates that none of these characteristics can be seen as proxies for ability on this speci…c task. We also not that CRT and Numeracy are not strongly correlated Table 3 : Determinants of productivity and probability of playing TTT in common wage treatments. with each other as the coe¢ cient of correlation between them is 0.0664 which indicates that they are not measuring the same underlying trait.
E¤ects of Inequality
While it was not directly incorporated into the theoretical model developed above, the experiment was designed under the assumption that any e¤ects of inequality would require time and repeated interaction in order to manifest. Had that not been the expectation, there would have been no reason to conduct more than a single round of production. The discouragement e¤ect, for example, is predicated on the notion that someone who is faced with a situation in which they are treated unequally will become frustrated by this unfair treatment and will respond to that frustration by eventually exerting lesser e¤ort. This hypothesized e¤ect should be expected to require time to develop as an individual must come to understand their situation on an emotional level before they would exhibit such a response. Our experiments were designed with exactly this expectation in mind. This is why we had subjects produce for multiple periods and why we reminded the subjects of their wage rate as well as the wage rate of the others on every result screen. The experience of exerting e¤ort round after round yet seeing that others are consistently better rewarded for their e¤ort is exactly the feedback that one would suspect could lead to the development of a discouragement e¤ect. A visual inspection of Figures 1 -4 will con…rm that in many cases there appear to be systematic di¤erences in responses to the treatments over time and so our statistical analysis will need to take that into account.
We will present a series of regression analyses to investigate whether or not there are statistically signi…cant treatment e¤ects which will also account for the expectation that any treatment e¤ects should take time to develop. Each of the regressions takes into account the panel structure of the data using a random e¤ects speci…cation with the standard errors clustered at the subject level. To allow for clean inference we only want to compare low (high) wage subjects in the relevant common wage treatment to low (high) wage subjects in the inequality treatments and so we conduct separate regressions for low and high wage subjects. When we later investigate the treatment e¤ects according to CRT/Numeracy traits, we will conduct separate regressions for each population so that, for example, we compare Low CRT and Low Wage subjects between treatments. The fundamental form of all of the regressions will be as follows:
where D 1i and D 2i represent dummy variables for the Disadvantaged Minority and Disadvantaged Majority treatments, respectively, and S t is a dummy variable which is set equal to 1 for the second half of the experiment (periods 7-12). The additional elements, P eriod t and X i ; are standard controls where P eriod t captures the learning e¤ect over time 9 and X i is a vector of control variables while c i is an unobserved individual e¤ect and " it is a standard error term. We can conduct this regression with and without the S t terms to examine how the treatment e¤ects change over time. We also present results from identically speci…ed regressions with DTTT as the dependent variable which is a binary variable indicating whether or not a subject played TTT at least once in a period.
The two base hypotheses underlying this study concern how low wage and high wage workers alter their productivity in the presence of inequality. Tables 4 and 5 contain the regression results indicating how low and high wage earners respond to inequality. Examining these results leads to our …rst two results.
Result 1 Discouragement Hypothesis -Workers facing disadvantageous inequality exhibit a larger drop in output in the second half of the experiments as compared to workers in the common low wage control treatment.
Result 2 Encouragement Hypothesis -Workers facing advantageous inequality show no sensitivity in their output to the presence or absence of inequality over the entire duration of the experiment.
The support for result 1 is based on the fact that the base treatment dummy variables in Table 4 are not signi…cant indicating that low wage workers show no signi…cant initial response to the existence of inequality. However the interaction variables between the treatment e¤ects and the dummy for the second half of the experiment are negative and statistically signi…cant at the 10% level. This is an indication that there is a signi…cant discouragement e¤ect in both treatments but it takes time to develop as was expected and anticipated in the design of the experiment. For the Disadvantaged Minority treatment, the TTT regressions indicate one reason for the drop in productivity on the encoding task as there is a signi…cant increase in the propensity of the subjects to play TTT in the second half of the experiment.
Result 2 is supported by the results in Table 5 which shows that both the base treatment dummies and the interactions with the second half dummy are generally insigni…cant. 10 The base treatment e¤ects are positive indicating there may be some initial encouragement e¤ect but it is not strong enough to be robustly signi…cant and the negative values for the change in the second half indicate that any initial encouragement e¤ect may dissipate over time though this too is insigni…cant.
Our next result relates to a test of the Income Inequality Aversion Hypothesis. The support for this result is obvious since this hypothesis generated predictions 9 We note that the learning e¤ect is not quite linear as shown in the …gures. We have conducted these regressions with dummy variables for each period to allow for a more general detrending of the data but …nd no substantial di¤erences in the results and therefore choose to present the more parsimonious speci…cation. 10 The base treatment e¤ect is posisitve and signi…cant for the Disadvantaged Majority treatment but only in the regression without demongraphic controls. exactly opposite of the …rst two. Thus our third result is of a failure to …nd support for the Income Inequality Aversion Hypothesis.
Result 3 Income Inequality Aversion Hypothesis -The productivity of low wage earners declines in the presence of inequality while that of high wage earners increases or is unchanged in contrast to the predictions of the Income Inequality Aversion hypothesis.
The next hypothesis that we will test is the group status hypothesis which states that the productivity response for the low wage workers should be larger in the Disadvantaged Minority treatment than in the Disadvantaged Majority treatment. Since there are no signi…cant productivity e¤ects for the high wage workers, this hypothesis is not applicable to them but our fourth result is based on testing this hypothesis for the low wage earners.
Result 4 Group Status Hypothesis -While the decrease in production in the second half of the experiment for workers facing disadvantageous inequality is larger (in absolute value) in the Disadvantaged Minority treatment than the Disadvantaged Majority treatment, these di¤erences are not statistically signi…cant.
We do …nd that the predicted ordinal ranking holds in that the decline in productivity in the second half of the experiment is greater in the Disadvantaged Minority than the Disadvantaged Majority treatment but a test to determine if the di¤erence is signi…cant fails to reject the null (p value=0.604). Consequently we fail to …nd strong evidence in support of this hypothesis. This indicates the possibility that individuals may judge the fairness of relative wages without substantial consideration for the relative sizes of the advantaged and disadvantaged groups or that our sample size was not large enough to allow us to establish the signi…cance of the e¤ect.
We now investigate whether we …nd a di¤erential response to inequality based on cognitive characteristics as measured by the CRT and Numeracy modules. We gathered these measures based on the possibility that individuals who scored di¤er-ently on these measures might well respond di¤erently to the presence of inequality. In the case of the CRT measure, it is hypothesized to measure the degree to which individuals are re ‡ective thinkers. This could be an important attribute in this environment as a re ‡ective thinker might, similar to the subjects in Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels (2005) , have looked at the mechanism for assigning wage rates and viewed it as fair since all subjects were equally likely to have received the superior wage. Non-re ‡ective or impulsive thinkers may have been more likely to respond to the immediate stimulus of the wage inequality itself. Thus non-re ‡ective thinkers might be expected to respond more strongly to the presence of inequality. The reason to be interested in how subjects scoring di¤erently on the Numeracy measure might respond di¤erently is based on the notion that highly numerate subjects may well have greater ability in schoolwork which places them in an advantaged class outside of the lab while the low numeracy subjects would be in a disadvantaged group. These two groups might well be expected to respond di¤erently to the imposition of a disadvantage as well. Given that the analysis above already demonstrated little of interest for the high wage workers, we will omit the regressions data for the high wage workers to conserve space. Table 6 provides the regression results to examine if there is a di¤erential response to inequality between Low CRT and High CRT subjects as well as Low Numeracy and High Numeracy subjects. An important point to remember is that as discussed before, these two cognitive measures are uncorrelated with each other and with overall performance on this task.
Result 5 CRT/Numeracy Hypothesis -Low CRT and Low Numeracy subjects exhibit a signi…cant discouragement e¤ect while High CRT and High Numeracy subjects do not.
We …nd strong support for claim that subjects who di¤er by CRT or Numeracy scores might respond di¤erently to the presence of inequality. In the second half of the experiments involving inequality for the Low CRT and Low Numeracy subjects but not for the High CRT and High Numeracy subjects. The High CRT subjects exhibit an insigni…cant increase in productivity while the High Numeracy subjects exhibit an insigni…cant decline in productivity. Consequently it is clear that we see stronger discouragement among Low CRT and Low Numeracy subjects than High CRT and High Numeracy subjects, at least for the second half of the experiment.
Inequality and E¢ ciency
The previous section focused on testing the hypotheses regarding the behavioral responses of individuals to the presence of inequality. One of the reasons that those responses are interesting is in how those individual behavioral responses aggregate into overall productivity. Due to the fact that we generally …nd support for the discouragement e¤ect and fail to …nd support for the encouragement e¤ect it should be clear that the overall e¤ect we …nd from inequality on productivity and e¢ ciency is negative.
To help interpret the magnitude of the e¤ect of inequality on e¢ ciency we can provide a few simple calculations of the e¢ ciency drop implied by the coe¢ cients from the regressions. In the overall sample we …nd that production in the second half of the experiment declines by 1.9-2.5 encoded strings per round for the low wage subjects. Given that in the Common Wage -Low sessions average productivity over the second half of the experiment was 32.13 strings per round per person, the decrease implied by the coe¢ cients represents a 5.9-7.8% drop in productivity. Were we to have found support for the encouragement e¤ect among the high wage workers then this drop might have been o¤set by increased productivity among high wage earners but we found that inequality had a neutral impact on the output of high wage workers. So the productivity of the high wage subjects does not counteract the productivity drop by low wage subjects. In the results from the low CRT subjects we have a reasonable argument that these subjects were more likely to see the wage inequality as unfair and since what we really want to measure is the consequences on e¢ ciency from inequality viewed as unfair then it is in the results from this sub-sample which might provide a more reliable benchmark for the e¢ ciency consequences of inequality. The coe¢ cients on the two interaction variables for the low CRT subjects receiving a low wage range from -3.25 to -4.46. In the Common Wage -Low treatment, the subjects in the same low CRT classi…cation produced on average 33.95 encodings per period and so those coe¢ cients suggest a 9.6-13.1% drop in productivity. The low CRT subjects earning a high wage exhibit no signi…cant response to the inequality so their response does not o¤set this productivity decline.
We do want to be clear that we are not proposing that the approximately 10% decline in productivity we …nd among low wage workers be interpreted as a reliable estimate of the magnitude of the discouragement e¤ect that might exist among, for example, members of a low caste in India. The results from this experiment can certainly not provide an answer that speci…c or that well calibrated to any speci…c situation. What we claim is that since we were able to generate a discouragement e¤ect of non-trivial size in this setting, then it provides strong support for the claim that there should exist a discouragement e¤ect, for example, among members of a low caste in India. This is therefore an important issue to consider in the design of policies aimed at enhancing economic development in countries with a substantial amount of discrimination based inequality. Combining this e¤ect with the theoretical work cited in the introduction the indication is that such inequality is likely to become persistent and will lead to negative consequences for economic growth and e¢ ciency.
Conclusion
The question that motivated this study concerns whether or not individuals who are faced with unequal earning opportunities will respond to any perceived unfairness by those receiving lesser opportunities decreasing work e¤ort. We …nd evidence in our overall sample that while there is no initial response to the inequality, after our subjects have experienced the inequality for several rounds those receiving a lower wage begin exerting less e¤ort than their counterparts in a control group with no inequality. For the subset of our sample who are measured to be impulsive decision makers through their score on the CRT, we …nd a much stronger discouragement e¤ect which is consistent with the claim that those who are more likely to see the wage allocation as unfair exhibit a stronger discouragement e¤ect.
These results represent clear and compelling evidence that in external situations when there are individuals faced with unequal opportunities which they deem unfair that they will also exhibit lower e¤ort and the consequences of this behavioral response could be substantial. This discouragement e¤ect could show up not only in on the job work e¤ort but also in human capital investment and other activities which help a person advance into higher earnings groups. If the inequality in opportunity is not transient, then this discouragement e¤ect could grow and combined with the forces described in Mookherjee and Ray (2003) and related studies can lead to persistent inequality and poverty. Thus this short term behavioral e¤ect could have long term consequences for the initial generation of workers exhibiting the response as well as their descendents.
At the aggregate level, if there are populations of workers exhibiting lower work e¤ort, investment in human capital and so on then there will certainly be negative impacts on economic growth and development. In our experiment we found output decreases around 10% and while we will certainly not claim that this number is an accurate estimate of the magnitude of the discouragement e¤ect in any other situation, it does suggest that the e¤ects will be of non-trivial magnitude. The reason is that given the setup in this experiment, there is every reason to suspect that subjects should be immune to a discouragement e¤ect building up over such a short time horizon from purely idiosyncratic wage assignment for performing a trivial task. Given the strength of the response that we …nd, it seems reasonable that in situations in which opportunity inequality is permanent and tied to an individual's race or caste then a discouragement e¤ect should be even more likely to occur and could well be stronger than what we measure here. Given the long run consequences to the individuals and the aggregate economy, this issue should be of concern to those designing policies to foster economic growth in countries in which such inequality exists.
An immediate follow-up question to the demonstration of this e¤ect is how robust it is to the inclusion of other elements which exist in labor markets such as the ability to improve one's wages or general returns on e¤ort. The …rst point in response to that question is that the main environments to which our study is meant to apply are situations of ethnic, racial, gender or caste based discrimination in which such inequality is (or as at least is perceived to be) permanent and outside the control of any single individual to a¤ect. For these situations, the lack of opportunity for the disadvantaged workers to be promoted to the advantaged group is entirely appropriate. Still there will be other related situations in which there may be some possibility of moving from the disadvantaged to the advantaged group and one may consider policies which speci…cally allow that as a means of overcoming the discouragement e¤ect. This leads to a question of how much of an advancement opportunity is necessary to overcome any discouragement e¤ects. This is not an issue considered in this paper but it is an important question to be investigated in future work.
